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that in none of them was the issue raised whether these matters should be
considered in certiorari. It disposed of them by saying "We think it
apparent that the references made in the opinions referred to resulted from
the manner in which these cases were presented and the issues there in-
volved."12 Does all this mean that the court will act to exclude matter
foreign to the record only at the instance of a vigilant attorney? It is
difficult to see the logic of such a holding. The nature of certiorari pro-
ceedings too clearly restricts them to the record, not as submitted, but to
the record proper. To make consideration of matters dehors the record a
function of the vigilance of the attorneys suggests an area of discretion
in the matter of what the court will consider. If such area exist, it should
scarcely be exercised in favor of a reneging stipulator. Rather, the in-
stant case must be taken to hold that, whether or not the court has nodded
in the past, the rule remains as it has always been and will be enforced in
the future.
W. G. P.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS--ANTI-TRUST
LEGISLATION-DIFFERENT SANCTIONS APPLIED TO AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY
-[United States].-Defendant was charged with participation in a con-
spiracy to fix the retail price of beer. Such a conspiracy in restraint of
trade is made a criminal offense by a Texas statute,1 which, however, ex-
empts from the operation of the law "agricultural products and livestock
in the hands of the producer and raiser."2 Another Texas statute3 attaches
civil liability to all conspiracies, without exemptions. Defendant sued out a
writ of habeas corpus and contended that the exemption fell within the
condemnation of Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co.4 as offensive to the
"equal protection of the laws" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
that therefore the Texas act was unconstitutional. Held, that the Texas
statute was constitutional, overruling the Connolly case. Tigner v. Texas.5
Gehner (1928) 320 Mo. 901, 903, 9 S. W. (2d) 621, 622, 59 A. L. R. 1041,
1043 (evidence before board); State ex rel. American Central Ins. Co. v.
Gehner (1926) 315 Mo. 1126, 1129, 280 S. W. 416 (references in stipulation
to allegations in petition); State ex rel. Compton v. Buder (1925) 308 Mo.
253, 259, 260, 271 S. W. 770, 771 (facts stipulated in the certiorari hear-
ing) ; State ex rel. Smith v. Williams (1925) 310 Mo. 267, 270, 275 S. W.
534, 535 (admissions in brief) ; State ex rel. Orr v. Buder (1925) 308 Mo.
237, 244, 271 S. W. 508, 509, 39 A. L. R. 1199, 1203 (allegations of peti-
tion) ; State ex rel. Adler v. Ossing (1935) 336 Mo. 386, 389, 79 S. W. (2d)
255, 256 (allegations in petition).
12. State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Neaf (Mo. 1940) 139 S. W.
(2d) 958, 966.
1. Texas Vernon's Stats. (1936) Penal Code, art. 1632 et seq.
2. Texas Vernon's Stats. (1936) Penal Code, art. 1642.
3. Texas Vernon's Stats. (1936) Rev. Civil Stats., art. 7426 et seq. For
a critical discussion of Texas anti-trust legislation, see Nutting, Texas Anti-
Trust Law: A Post Mortem (1936) 14 Tex. L. Rev. 293.
4. (1902) 184 U. S. 540 (same exemption held unconstitutional).
5. (1940) 310 U. S. 141, reh. den. (1940) 310 U. S. 659.
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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
There is no doubt that a legislature has power to classify where differ-
ences exist and may select certain activities to legislate upon and exclude
others in accordance with that classification. 6 In determining whether the
classification attempted by a given statute can be sustained, the recognized
test is whether the classification is "based upon some reasonable ground-
some difference which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted
classification-and is not mere arbitrary selection."
7
The legislature must be allowed some latitude of judgment.8 That the
legislature has enjoyed a wide discretion in the matter of classification and
resulting exemptions is evidenced by cases allowing legislative bodies to
encourage steam laundries and discourage hand laundries; 9 to require a
license fee of elevators situated on a railroad right of way, though none is
required of elevators not so situated; 10 to select the business of fire insur-
ance as a special target for anti-monopolistic regulation, though exempting
other types of insurance companies;" to require a license tax on persons
and corporations carrying on the business of refining sugar and molasses,
though excluding planters and farmers grinding and refining their own
sugar and molasses.12
The diametrically opposed decisions of the Connolly and Tigner cases
represent two different approaches to the problem. Conceptualistically, if
the legislature wishes to control trusts and combinations, the same sanc-
tions must be applied under the "equal protection" clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to all who fit the definition. The majority in the Connolly case
took the position that conspirators, whether agricultural or industrial, are
conspirators within the meaning of the statute. But, in the language of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in the instant case,
The equality at which the 'equal protection' clause aims is not a
disembodied equality. * * * The Constitution does not require things
which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though
they were the same.' 8
Realistically, a legislature may recognize the variant economic structures
of agriculture and industry. Experience shows that the damage to trade
resulting from the activities of a loose-knit agricultural combination is
small, whereas that from the powerful industrial combination is great. The
factual dissimilarity is succinctly summarized by the court in the Tigner
case:
6. Carrington, Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (8th ed. 1927) 812,
and cases there cited; Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law (1939) 457-460, and
cases there cited.
7. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Ellis (1897) 165 U. S. 150. See: Magoun v.
Illinois Trust and Savings Bank Co. (1898) 170 U. S. 283; Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co. (1911) 220 U. S. 61; Central Lumber Co. v.
South Dakota (1912) 226 U. S. 157.
8. International Harvester Co. v. Missouri (1914) 234 U. S. 199, 214.
9. Quong Wing v. Kirkendall (1912) 223 U. S. 59.
10. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota (1901) 180 U. S. 452.
11. Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co. (1905) 199 U. S. 401.
12. American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana (1900) 179 U. S. 89.
13. Tigner v. Texas (1940) 310 U. S. 141, 147 (italics supplied).
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* * * These large sections of the population [farmers] * * * were as
a matter of economic fact in a different relation to the community from
that occupied by industrial combinations. Farmers were widely scat-
tered and inured to habits of individualism; their economic fate was in
large measure dependent upon contingencies beyond their control.
* * * the threat [to the community] was of a different order from that
arising through combinations of industrialists and middlemen.14
An additional point raised by the defendant in the present case was that,
since agricultural combinations are exempted from the criminal statute
and not from the civil statute, the validity of the criminal statute is under-
mined and thus both statutes are invalidated. The court disposes of this
contention by saying that classifications that permit substantive differentia-
tions also permit differentiations of remedy. The Constitution contains no
doctrinaire requirement that acts and evils differing in degree though not in
kind must be subjected to identical remedial sanctions. S. M. M.
MANDAMUS - CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION - REFUSAL OF
LIQUOR LICENSE;--[Missouri].Petitioner applied to the director of liquor
licenses of Kansas City for a retail dealer's license. Pursuant to a city
ordinance, the application was referred to the board of police commissioners
and an investigation was ordered, the application to be returned to the
director with a report and recommendation. The report of the police com-
missioners recommended that no license be issued. Although not legally
bound to follow the recommendation of the police commissioners, the di-
rector refused to issue the license. Petitioner then procured an alternative
writ of mandamus commanding respondent to issue or show cause. The
trial resulted in a judgment which, in effect, made the writ permanent,
compelling the issuance of a license. From this judgment, respondent ap-
pealed. Held, that the director of liquor licenses, in the grant or refusal of
licenses, exercised a type of discretion that can not be controlled by man-
damus. Mangieracina v. Haney.1
It is a well-established rule that mandamus will issue to compel the
performance of a simple ministerial duty by a recalcitrant official. 2 When,
however, discretion is reposed in an official by law, and when the official has
properly exercised his judgment, the courts will refuse to issue mandamus
14. Id. at 145 (italics supplied). See Northern Wisconsin Co-op Tobacco
Pool v. Bekkedal (1924) 182 Wis. 571, 588, 197 N. W. 936, 943. See gen-
erally, Hanna, Cooperative Associations and the Public (1930) 29 Mich. L.
Rev. 148, 159, 163. See United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative (1939)
307 U. S. 533, for list of state cases approving special advantages given
agricultural cooperatives. See Note (1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 347, 354, for state
statutes containing exemption similar to Texas act.
1. (Mo. App. 1940) 141 S. W. (2d) 89.
2. Dreyfus v. Lonergan (1898) 73 Mo. App. 336; State ex rel. Schade v.
Russell (1908) 131 Mo. App. 638, 110 S. W. 667; State ex rel. Journal
Printing Co. v. Dreyer (1914) 183 Mo. App. 463, 167 S. W. 1123; State
ex rel..Adamson v. Lafayette County Court (1867) 41 Mo. 545; State ex
rel. Metcalf v. Garesche (1877) 65 Mo. 480; State ex rel. North and South
Ry. v. Meier (1898) 143 Mo. 439, 45 S. W. 306; State ex rel. Dolman v.
Dickey (1920) 280 Mo. 536, 219 S. W. 363.
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